Estimating the Impact of Time-Invariant Variables on FDI with Fixed Effects by Ionascu, Delia et al.
 Department of Economics
Copenhagen Business School
Working paper  2-2007
ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF 
TIME-INVARIANT VARIABLES 
ON FDI WITH FIXED EFFECTS
Ronald  B. Davies Delia Ionascu, Helga Kristjánsdótt ir
____________________________________________________
Department of Economics -Porcelænshaven 16A, 1.fl. - DK-2000 Frederiksberg
 Estimating the Impact of Time-Invariant Variables on 
FDI with Fixed Effects 
 
 
Ronald B. Davies*, Delia Ionascu**, and Helga Kristjánsdóttir*** 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper applies the panel fixed effects with vector decomposition estimator 
to three FDI datasets to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables on FDI while 
including fixed effects. We find that the omission of fixed effects significantly biases 
several of these variables, especially those proxying for trade costs and culture. After 
including fixed effects, we find that many time-invariant variables indicate the 
importance of vertical FDI. We also find that by eliminating these biases, the differences 
across datasets largely disappear. Thus, controversies in the literature that are driven by 
differences in data sets may be resolved by using this estimation technique. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F14, F23 
Key Words: Foreign Direct Investment, Trade Costs, Culture 
                                                 
* Department of Economics, 435 PLC Building, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97405. Phone: 
(541) 346-4671. Fax: (541) 346-1243. Email: rdavies@uoregon.edu. This paper was written while 
supported by the Institute for International Integration Studies at Trinity College, Dublin. I graciously 
acknowledge their support. 
** Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 16A, 2000 Frederiksberg, 
Denmark; Phone: +45 38152605; Fax: +45 3815 2576; E-mail: di.eco@cbs.dk 
*** Departments of Economics, Oddi við Sturlugötu, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland.  Phone: +354 551-1718; Fax: 
+354 551-1718; E-mail: helgakr@hi.is.  Research supported by the Icelandic Research Fund. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 In the empirical literature on foreign direct investment (FDI), several variables 
have entered the standard canon of control variables. Some of these, such as GDP of the 
parent and host countries, vary over time. Others, such as distance between countries, do 
not. As a result, when using fixed effects to control for unobserved variation across 
countries, coefficients for these time-invariant variables cannot be estimated.1 
Nevertheless, doing so is important because such variables proxy for trade costs and 
therefore yield insights into the motivation behind FDI. If FDI happens in order to gain 
access to consumers, higher trade costs are expected to increase FDI (horizontal FDI).2 
Alternatively, if FDI takes place to create global production networks, higher trade costs 
decrease FDI (vertical FDI).3 Recently, however, Plümper and Troeger (forthcoming) 
have developed a three-stage estimation procedure that efficiently estimates the impact of 
time-invariant variables while also controlling for fixed effects. The primary goal of this 
paper is to apply this panel fixed effects with vector decomposition (XTFEVD) method 
to three commonly used FDI data sets.4 Importantly, we find that the coefficients on 
several commonly-used time-invariant variables change sign when doing so. After 
correcting for the biases caused by the omission of fixed effects, our estimates suggest 
the importance of vertical FDI. In addition, we find that using XTFEVD is useful in 
                                                 
1 For example, as demonstrated by Baltagi, Egger, and Pfeffermayr (forthcoming) and Blonigen, Davies, 
Waddell, and Naughton (forthcoming) including fixed effects is typically sufficient to absorb any third 
country effects. 
2 Models in this vein include Markusen's (1984) seminal paper and recent innovations such as the export 
platform literature of Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (forthcoming), Bergstrand and Egger (forthcoming), 
and Yeaple (2003). 
3 Early work in this direction includes that of Helpman (1984). More recent contributions include Baltagi, 
Egger, and Pfaffermayr (forthcoming). The knowledge capital model, discussed in detail by Markusen 
(2002), incorporates aspects of both vertical and horizontal FDI. 
4 As detailed below, we use bilateral stock and sales data involving the US, bilateral stock data involving an 
OECD country, and inbound and outbound flows from the World Bank. 
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eliminating many of the differences in the coefficients found across data sets. This 
suggests that the presence of unobserved country heterogeneity and differences in the 
extent of this problem across data sets may be behind many of the controversies in the 
empirical literature on FDI (see Blonigen, 2005, for a recent survey of these debates). 
Thus, XTFEVD is a useful tool in resolving these problems. 
 Our second contribution is to use information on culture to ascertain the degree to 
which the cultures of the parent and host countries affect investment patterns. There is a 
growing body of theory looking at the impact of culture (which is related to networks 
both in production and consumption) and international trade issues (see Janeba, 
forthcoming, for a recent review). Using the cultural indicators developed by Hofstede 
(1980) and Hofstede and Bond (1988), we find that culture is a significant predictor of 
FDI. Since these measures do not vary over time, XTFEVD is again useful for removing 
the biases caused by unobserved heterogeneity across countries. In particular, our 
estimates suggest that it is more the cultural attributes of the parent and the host 
separately that matter rather than the differences between them. Specifically, we find that 
more FDI comes from and goes to countries built around masculine values (e.g. 
competitiveness, assertiveness, ambition, accumulation of wealth), to societies where 
individuals pursue long term goals and dislike waste, to cultures that handle uncertainty 
easily, and to countries in which inequality in power is accepted by the less powerful in 
society. Also, we find more FDI outflows from countries in which people like to 
undertake independent initiatives but less FDI inflows into these countries. Many of these 
results conform to anecdotal beliefs on multinationals since these firms are highly 
competitive, undertake risky ventures such as R&D and international dealings, and are 
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based around creative, intangible assets. Thus, these results provide an empirical 
motivation for expanding the research on the relationship between trade and culture into 
FDI and culture.5  
 In our analysis, we use three of the most commonly-used FDI datasets, all of 
which run from 1980 to 2000. The first is the BEA data which covers bilateral US 
inbound and US outbound FDI stocks and affiliate sales. The second uses bilateral 
inbound FDI stocks where either the parent or host country belongs to the OECD. The 
third is provided by the World Bank (WB) and reports total inbound and total outbound 
FDI flows for a wide variety of countries. Our motivation for using these datasets is 
twofold. First, these are the most commonly employed datasets in the literature. 
Therefore this allows us to compare our results to the broadest set of existing literature. 
Second, by using XTFEVD, we are able to shed some light onto why the estimated 
impact of variables such as distance or common language vary from study to study. 
When using XTFEVD, we find that many of the conflicting results found from OLS 
regressions are resolved. This indicates not only the importance of the biases created by 
unobserved country heterogeneity, but that the extent and direction of these biases vary 
across datasets. Thus, using XTFEVD aids in filtering out such effects, yielding results 
that are more robust to alternative datasets than the OLS ones. 
 Beyond this, our analysis reveals several things. First, the introduction of fixed 
effects does have a significant impact on the magnitudes of the time-varying variables. In 
                                                 
5 Related to our results on the level of FDI activity is the literature on cultural differences and the entry 
mode of multinationals. Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005) provide an overview of this literature. 
Ionascu, Meyer and Estrin (2006) is a more recent addition that uses a composite measure of cultural 
differences composed from the same measures we use. Consistent with other studies, they find that 
multinationals tend towards greenfield investment (as opposed to acquisitions or joint ventures) when 
cultural differences are small. 
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particular, parent and host population coefficients are biased towards zero. Looking at the 
time-invariant variables we find a number of sign reversals after employing the XTFEVD 
method. For example, in the US data, we find an inverted U shape for distance between 
the parent and host countries when not controlling for fixed effects. When doing so, we 
find a U shape, a result also found in the OECD data. In addition, all three data sets, we 
find that excluding fixed effects introduces a downward bias in the estimated impact of 
parent and host country area.  
 The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical 
specification, describes our data and provides a brief discussion of the XTFEVD 
estimation procedure. Section 3 contains our empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Estimation Approach and Data 
 This section details our regression specification, notable features of the data, and 
discusses our estimation techniques (in particular, the XTFEVD method). 
2.1 Regression Specification 
Our baseline estimation specification is the gravity model of FDI. This 
specification is the workhorse of the empirical FDI literature and has been used by 
numerous studies.6 This estimating equation uses information on the parent country i 
and/or the host country j to predict the amount of FDI activity in year t. This baseline 
specification is: 
                                                 
6 Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (forthcoming), Gbetnkom (2006), Tong (2005), Gao (2005), 
Head and Ries (2005), di Giovanni (2005), Grubert and Mutti (2004), Brainard (1997), Eaton and Tamura 
(1994) are but a few examples. See Blonigen (2005) for a recent overview of the empirical FDI literature. It 
should be noted that there is also the specification proposed by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) which 
uses data in levels instead of logs and explicit interaction terms to control for the joint influence of some 
variables. However, Blonigen and Davies (2004) finds that due to the skewed nature of FDI data, this 
specification tends to yield non-normal residuals. The use of logs, however, reduces this problem while 
simultaneously allowing for implicit interactions between the various control variables. 
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where non-dummy variables are measured in logs.  
The parent variables include real GDP (Parent GDP), population (Parent Pop), a 
measure of trade costs (Parent TC), and area of the country (Parent Area). The host 
variables include a comparable set of controls (Host GDP, Host Pop, Host TC, and Host 
Area). In addition, we include a measure of host investment costs (Host Inv Cost). 
Beyond these parent- and host-specific variables, we also include a set of variables that 
use information from both the host and parent countries (the pair variables). Distance and 
its squared value (Distance Sq) control for geographic proximity between countries. Two 
other variables (Island and Landlock) measure the number of island nations or landlocked 
nations in the country pair. As these are often significant in regressions of bilateral trade, 
to the extent that these are positively correlated with trade costs they can provide insight 
into the motivations behind FDI.7 Common Language is a dummy variable equal to one if 
there is a shared language between the countries. As with the trade and investment cost 
data, this is intended to capture some of the difficulty of doing business between the 
nations. Colony is a dummy variable equal to one when two countries share a common 
colonial history. This is intended to proxy for historical factors that increase the political 
and economic links between nations. To control for macroeconomic fluctuations, we 
control for the percentage change in the parent/host exchange rate from year t-1 to t (X-
rate).8 
 In addition to these, we include a set of variables that compare information 
between the parent and host countries. Specifically, we compare the amount of schooling 
                                                 
7 See Rose (2004) for an example of these in a trade regression. There, he finds that landlocked and island 
countries have less trade. 
8 Note that, since this is often negative, unlike the other variables this is not measured in logs. 
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and cultural aspects as defined by Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede and Bond (1988) across 
countries by subtracting the host value of the variable in question from the parental value. 
Doing so, however, creates two difficulties. First, when the parental value is less than the 
host value, the difference is negative and we cannot take the log of a negative value. 
Second, and potentially more important, there is the issue raised by Blonigen, Davies, 
and Head (2003) regarding deviations from zero. In that paper, they point out that when 
estimating the effect of skill asymmetries on FDI, it is important to control for not just 
skill differences, but for differences from zero as the estimated impact of a movement 
away from zero can reduce FDI regardless of whether this is a movement into the 
positive range (where parent schooling is greater than host schooling, a positive 
difference) or into the negative range (where parent schooling is less than host schooling, 
a negative difference). One possible way to deal with this is to use absolute value of the 
difference. However, as Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2003) note, this unnecessarily 
restricts the slope of this difference variable to be the same on either side of zero. 
Therefore, we instead use an approach similar to that of Markusen and Maskus (2002), 
where we include two separate variables, one for positive differences and one for 
negative differences. This allows us to see whether it is a deviation from zero that matters 
(in which case both should have the same sign) or not. In the gravity model, where 
variables are measured in logs, doing so also eliminates the problem of taking the log of a 
negative difference. Thus, our additional pair variables include differences in schooling 
(School), and differences on five cultural aspects: power distance (PD), individualism 
(Independence), masculinity (Masculinity), uncertainty tolerance (Uncertainty), and long-
term orientation (Time). These are discussed in more detail below. Each of these appears 
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once for a positive difference (Diff Pos) and once for a negative difference (Diff Neg) for 
a total of twelve variables. Note that, with the exception of the school differences, these 
do not vary over time. Finally, we include a time trend (Trend). 
 In contrast to the bilateral US and OECD datasets, the WB data do not include 
information on the parent countries for the inbound data or the host countries for the 
outbound data. Therefore, in these regressions we are restricted to the host variables or 
the home variables respectively. We also cannot use the difference variables and 
therefore simply use the values of these variables for the country in question. 
2.2 Data 
In the Data Appendix, Table A1 contains a description of the units and sources for 
each of the variables. Table A2 contains summary statistics for each of the three data sets. 
Table A3 reports the list of parent and host countries used.9 While we refer the interested 
reader to the appendix for details, there are five aspects of the data that warrant 
discussion here.  
We use three measures of FDI activity: real affiliate sales, real FDI stocks, and 
real FDI flows.10 The first is preferable for two reasons. First, it captures the value of FDI 
activity and therefore helps to control for differences in the technology across firms. 
Second, sales are the current value of the activity whereas stocks are the accumulated 
value of investment flows over time. As such, stock measures are dependent upon how 
historical values are measured. The upside of the stock and flow measures, however, is 
their availability. Our goal in this paper is to use commonly-employed variables – 
                                                 
9 Note that in the World Bank data, the same countries appear in both the inbound and outbound samples, 
thus the difference in the number of observations is due to differences in missing years between the 
samples. 
10 Both were converted to constant 2000 US dollars using the chain-type price index for gross domestic 
investment obtained from the Economic Report to the President (US, 2007). 
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including FDI measures – in order to enhance comparability between our results and 
those elsewhere. However, the only commonly-available sales data are for the US. 
Therefore for the OECD we are forced to use FDI stocks.11 For the World Bank data, we 
must use net inflows and net outflows of FDI.12 Another item to be aware of is that even 
in the US data, one can obtain different results for sales and stocks (see Davies, 
forthcoming, for an example). One contribution of this paper is that when we use the 
XTFEVD, we find comparable results for the US stock and sales results, even though 
OLS gives us different estimated signs for some variables across these datasets. 
Second, it is important to note that the US data includes both inbound and 
outbound data. Therefore, in these data we include a dummy variable Inbound which is 
equal to one if the observation is for US inbound FDI. An alternative to combining the 
inbound and outbound data is to run separate regressions for each. In unreported results 
we did just this. On the whole, we found insignificance for the US-only variables but 
roughly similar signs on the pair variables as in the reported results.13 However, due to 
the drop in the number of observations, we the estimated coefficients were generally less 
significant than those found here. Similar to the US data, the OECD data reports FDI 
stocks inbound into an OECD country or outbound from and OECD country. When both 
countries are OECD countries, we have two observations on FDI. Due to differing 
definitions of FDI, the exchange rate used to convert the amount, and other reporting 
method differences, these two measures often differ. Therefore when two observations 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that even within the US data, FDI stock information is available for a wider selection of 
countries. 
12 A positive net inflow of FDI for country i is an increase in the stock of FDI held by foreign investors in 
country i. A positive net outflow of FDI for country i is an increase in the stock of FDI held by i's investors 
overseas. Thus, these are not the difference between inbound and outbound FDI. 
13 These alternative results are available on request. 
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were available, we used the inbound data.14 As with the US results, to allow for 
differences in the average level of FDI between the inbound and outbound sources, we 
include a dummy variable Inbound. 
Third, given the importance of trade costs in differentiating between motivations 
for FDI, it is important to consider the construction of our trade cost measure. In our data, 
a country's trade cost is the log of GDP divided by the sum of exports and imports (i.e. 
one over openness). This proxy is admittedly rough, in particular since large countries 
tend to trade less than small countries. However, we use this variable because it is both 
available for a large number of countries and is frequently used elsewhere. Likewise, 
distance, which is measured as the kilometers between capital cities, is at best an 
approximation of the distance between countries. Alternative measures use the distance 
between geographic centers or between economic centers. However, again, distance 
between capitals is the most widely measure of distance and we therefore use it here.  
Fourth, our measure of investment costs comes from the Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence S.A. and is measured as the inverse of a composite index comprising 
operations risk index, political risk index and remittance and repatriation factor index.15 
This variable limits the time series in our data to, depending on the country pair, 1980 to 
2000. In unreported results, we excluded this variable in order to extend the time 
dimension of our data to as long as 1966-2005. This did not, however, qualitatively alter 
our results and, given the significance of the variable, we only report those results 
including it. 
                                                 
14 When using only inbound data, the signs and significance of the coefficients from the XTFEVD 
regression match those for the OECD XTFEVD results with the exception that both parent and host trade 
costs are significantly positive.  
15 For more information see http://www.beri.com. 
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Finally, given their relative unfamiliarity, our cultural variables deserve more 
detailed description. To capture the cultural characteristics of a country we use the five 
cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede to affect the behavior of individuals and 
organizations (Hofstede 1980, and Hofstede and Bond 1988). The first of these is power 
distance (PD), which indicates the degree to which the less powerful segment of a society 
expects and accepts that power is distributed unequally. In countries that score high on 
this dimension individuals consent to a less equal society and organizations are likely to 
have centralized, top-down control. Second, we use the individualism measure 
(Independence). This variable reflects the extent to which people follow a group or 
organization. Countries with high values on individualism are those in which people act 
independently and pursue independent initiatives. Third, masculinity (Masculinity) 
ascertains the values around which a society is built: masculinity (e.g. competitiveness, 
assertiveness, ambition, accumulation of wealth) or femininity (e.g. relationships, quality 
of life). High scores are for societies with masculine traits. Fourth, uncertainty tolerance 
(Uncertainty) indicates the extent to which individuals value predictability. If a country 
scores high on uncertainty tolerance, the people in the country prefer rules and structured 
situations and are likely to avoid uncertain situations. Finally, long-term orientation 
(Time) measures to what extent people value thrift and perseverance. Cultures that attach 
a high importance to the past and present, such as those oriented on respect for tradition 
and fulfillment of social obligations score low on this dimension while cultures in which 
people are patient in waiting for results and value thrift receive high scores. 
2.3 Estimating Procedures 
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 For each dataset, we utilize three estimating procedures. First, as is common, we 
use OLS. Second, we include parent country-host country pair fixed effects (or simply 
country fixed effects in the WB data). As can be seen, many of our variables do not vary 
over time and we are unable to include them when using the standard fixed effects 
procedure. This is the purpose of utilizing the third method, the panel fixed effects with 
vector decomposition (XTFEVD) method. As this method is relatively new, it is useful to 
provide an overview of its workings in the context of our model.  
 The XTFEVD estimation procedure is a three-step estimator. The first step 
estimates a fixed effects regression with only the time-varying variables to obtain 
estimated country pair fixed effects (referred to as the unit effects). It is important to note 
that these estimated unit effects include both the impact of time-invariant unobservables 
as well as time-invariant observables (such as distance or area).  The second step 
decomposes these estimated unit effects into an explainable part (attributed to the time-
invariant observables) and an unexplainable part (Residualsi,j,t) using OLS. The third 
stage then uses a pooled OLS that includes the time-varying variables, the time-invariant 
observables, and the time-invariant unexplainable Residualsi,j,t. This then yields the 
equivalent of a fixed effects estimator, with the exception that the time-invariant effects 
are decomposed into its observable and unobservable components. Of particular 
importance is that the procedure developed by Plümper and Troeger (forthcoming) is 
consistent and, as they demonstrate with Monte Carlo simulations, more efficient than 
other estimators attempting a similar decomposition.16 Given the relatively short time 
frame of FDI data, this efficiency is a valuable attribute of the technique. 
                                                 
16 See Plümper and Troeger (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on these other estimators as well as the 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
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3. Results 
 In this section, we present our results. We begin with those for the bilateral US 
data, move to those from the bilateral OECD data, and then to those from the unilateral 
World Bank data. Finally, given the insights obtained from the World Bank results, we 
then return to the US and OECD data for a final set of results. 
3.1 US Results 
 Table 1 presents our estimates from the US data. The first three columns report 
results when using FDI stocks, the last three report the results when using affiliate sales. 
Columns (1) and (4) contain the OLS results. Comparing these, we see that several 
estimates are consistent between the stock and sales results. In particular, FDI activity is 
largest between parent and host countries with large GDPs and small populations. In 
addition, higher trade costs seem to reduce FDI. This would be consistent with a vertical 
motivation behind FDI with the US. By way of contrast, however, Island is significantly 
positive in the stock results. Given that this is identified as a trade barrier by Rose (2004), 
this indicates the presence of horizontal FDI. Turning to the distance variables, the stock 
results indicate an inverted U shape (where the coefficients imply a negative effect for 
distance for all countries in the sample) whereas the sales results find no significant 
impact from distance. Thus, while there are similarities between the samples there are 
also many notable differences. Other differences include a perplexing positive effect of 
host investment costs in the sales data but an insignificant impact in the stock results. In 
addition, having a schooling deficient parent is a detriment to FDI in the sales results but 
not in the stock results. As for the cultural variables, with the exception of the 
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independence variables which are only significant in the stock data, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients are consistent between samples. Finally, the area variables indicate 
that more FDI activity comes from small parents and that host size has no impact on FDI. 
 Columns (2) and (3) employ fixed effects instead of OLS. Now, in contrast to the 
OLS results, the only difference between the stock and sales data is in the host trade cost 
which is significantly negative in the sales data but (just) insignificantly negatively in the 
stock data while the reverse is true for parent population. This would seem to suggest that 
including country-pair fixed effects is capable of eliminating many of the differences 
between samples. This seeming similarity, however, is somewhat misleading because 
many of the variables that differed in the OLS sample cannot be included in this fixed 
effects regression. Looking at the impact of the fixed effects on the magnitude of the 
coefficients, we see that in the stock data, including fixed effects lowers the coefficients 
on parent GDP, parent population, parent trade costs, and host population but increases 
the coefficient on host trade costs. The sales data, however, sees the coefficients on 
parent population, parent trade costs, and host trade costs moving in the opposite 
direction. However, similar to the stock data, the estimate on host population falls. We 
are unable to comment the extent to which the time-invariant variable estimates may be 
biased by the omission of unobserved factors since they cannot be included in the fixed 
effects estimation. 
 With this in mind, we now turn to the XTFEVD results from columns (3) and (6). 
In terms of the time-varying variables, as expected, we find similar signs and magnitudes 
between the fixed effects and XTFEVD results. Notably, however, the only difference 
between the two is that host investment costs are significantly negative in the stock 
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results but insignificant in the sales results. Turning to the time-invariant variables, 
however, we find a number of significant changes between their OLS coefficients and 
these which correct for unobservable time-invariant factors. Looking at the geographic 
variables, we now find a U shape for distance which, given the estimates, indicates that 
more FDI takes place between distant countries. In the US data, these coefficients mean 
that there are no country pairs sufficiently close for distance to have a negative effect. 
This is suggestive of horizontal FDI and the opposite of what is found in the OLS results. 
The other geographic trade cost measures –including Island and Landlock – now suggest 
that trade barriers reduce FDI. This is more consistent with a vertical motivation for FDI. 
Since the aggregate data likely includes both horizontal and vertical style FDI, it is not 
surprising that we find evidence of both. Turning to the other trade cost measures, 
Common Language and Colony, also find significant changes. Specifically, whereas the 
OLS results indicate that a common language increases FDI but colonial ties have no 
effect, the XTFEVD results reveal the reverse. Thus, the time-invariant trade cost 
variables appear to be significantly impacted by the omission of fixed effects.  
 Turning to the culture variables, we find two large changes. OLS indicated that 
FDI was greatest when the Independence and Uncertainty values for the parent were low 
relative to the host, the XTFEVD results indicate the reverse. In addition, with the 
exception of Uncertainty Diff Neg, which is negative in the stock results but insignificant 
in the sales results, the difference variables all have the same sign across the two samples. 
Thus, the XTFEVD results indicate that FDI activity is greatest when the parent's PD, 
Masculinity, or Time levels are low relative to the host's and when the parent's 
Independence and Uncertainty levels are high relative to the host's. Interestingly, it is 
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worth noting that these patterns reject the concern that cultural differences, i.e. symmetric 
deviations from zero, drive FDI. 
 Finally, with the exception of the Parent Area in the sales results, we find that 
more FDI takes place when the parent and/or the host are large. This suggests that natural 
resource abundance may be important for investment decisions and matches the findings 
of Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991). In addition, the significant effect on Residuals 
indicates that the unexplainable component of the fixed effects is indeed important for 
explaining FDI patterns. Finally, in the XTFEVD results, the additional controls 
(Inbound, X-Rate, Year) are all insignificant.  
3.2 OECD Results 
 Table 2 presents a comparable set of regressions using the OECD data rather than 
the US data. First, comparing the OLS results from the OECD regression to their 
counterpart in the US data (column (1) of Table 1), we see several noticeable differences, 
especially with regards to the time-invariant variables. In particular, rather than the 
inverted U for distance in the US results, the OECD estimates indicate a U shape. In 
addition, the OECD data find a significant impact from Host Area and Colony. 
Furthermore, the OECD results find significantly negative effects from both Island and 
Landlock. Similar differences are found for the Uncertainty and Time variables, which 
suggest an opposite effect from the US results. Finally, Host Pop is insignificant in the 
OECD results instead of significantly negative. 
 Turning to the FE results, as in the US data, we find significant declines in the 
coefficients for Parent Pop and Host Pop suggesting that these are biased upwards by the 
omitted, time-invariant unobservables. Unlike the US data, we find that the omission of 
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fixed effects biased our Parent TC and Host TC variables downwards. We also find that 
including fixed effects eliminates the significance of the schooling variables. 
Finally, column (3) presents the XTFEVD results from the OECD data. As in the 
US data, when comparing these OECD XTFEVD with the OLS results in column (1), we 
find several changes. Most notably, we now find both Area variables are significantly 
positive. In addition, we see a reversal in the predicted patterns of the Independence and 
Time difference variables and the Common Language dummy. This again indicates that 
the omitted fixed effects led to biases here. It is worth noting that the direction of these 
biases are shared between the US and OECD results. Thus, using XTFEVD is helpful in 
resolving inconsistencies across both of the US datasets and the OECD dataset. In fact, 
after accounting for the fixed effects through XTFEVD, with the exception of the Parent 
TC and PD Diff Neg, there are no differences in the signs of the significant estimates 
found in the three samples. It is worth recognizing, however, that the OECD results are 
relatively more consistent between the OLS and XTFEVD results than the US data are. 
This suggests that estimates obtained from data with more variety in country pairs may be 
less susceptible to these omitted variable biases than those from data where a single 
country is common to all observations.  
3.3 World Bank Results 
 Table 3 presents the estimates from the World Bank data. Columns (1) through 
(3) are the estimates using inbound FDI data. Thus, in these columns variables 
correspond to the host values. Columns (4) through (6) are for the outbound FDI data. In 
these three columns, the variables are for the parent country. As before, columns (1) and 
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(4) present OLS estimates, columns (2) and (5) report fixed effects estimates, and 
columns (3) and (6) present the XTFEVD estimates. 
Looking first at the time-varying variables, we find many similarities between the 
previous results and these. As before, most FDI activity goes to or comes from large 
economies with small populations and that this latter effect is enhanced by the inclusion 
of fixed effects. This pattern, including the bias, is consistent with the bilateral FDI 
results above. Consistent with the US results, more FDI goes to countries with low trade 
costs. Similar to the OECD findings, the effect of the parent's trade cost is biased 
downwards by the omission of fixed effects. Also similar to the previous results, we find 
that more FDI comes from countries with high schooling levels (at least when fixed 
effects are included). Somewhat surprisingly, we find that more FDI goes to countries 
with low skill levels, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. Thus, 
yet again, we find that the omission of unobserved time-invariant variables biases several 
standard time-varying control variables.  
We also find that the omission of fixed effects biases many of the time-invariant 
variables. When using OLS, we find insignificant effects on Landlock in both the 
inbound and outbound data. Island, meanwhile, is insignificant in the inbound data but 
significantly positive in the outbound data. When using XTFEVD, however, we find the 
same results from the other data sets, namely that landlocked and island nations receive 
less investment. This is indicative of vertical FDI. There does not appear to be a 
significant bias in Area, however, which is positive throughout. This then also matches 
the bilateral data XTFEVD results. 
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Looking at the cultural variables, the OLS results indicate several differences 
between the inbound and outbound sample. As with the US stock and sales data, this 
appears to be due to omitted fixed effects. When they are included in columns (3) and (6), 
we find the same predicted signs in each. These signs seem to indicate that more FDI 
comes from and goes to countries with high PD, Masculinity, and Time values and those 
with low Independence and Uncertainty values. Finally as in the US data, when using 
XTFEVD, neither X-rate nor Trend are significant.  
3.4 To Difference or Not to Difference? 
 We see an important difference between the bilateral data results and those from 
the World Bank data when comparing the difference variables to their counterparts in 
Table 3. For example, the bilateral data indicate that FDI activity is greatest when the 
parent has a high PD measure compared to that of the host (i.e. when the difference 
between the two is large and positive). Looking at the World Bank results, this might lead 
one to expect that a given country's PD would have a positive effect on its outbound FDI 
but a negative effect on its inbound FDI.17 As Table 3 shows, this is not the case. 
Therefore, for our final set of results, we return to the bilateral US and OECD data but 
replace the difference terms with a set of parent and host variables. Table 4 shows the 
results when also controlling for fixed effects through XTFEVD. 
 As in the World Bank results, we find that many of the formerly differenced 
variables exhibit the same sign for the parent and host countries. In particular, FDI is 
greatest when both countries have high PD scores, high Masculinity scores, and low 
Uncertainty scores. These results match the World Bank results and imply that using 
                                                 
17 This is only approximately correct because it is primarily true for countries with either very high or very 
low values when compared to the sample average.  
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difference terms is inappropriate for these variables. For the stock regressions (columns 
(1) and (3)) we find that the parent and host Independence coefficients have the opposite 
signs, implying that FDI is greatest when the parent has a high Independence score and 
the host has a low one. A similar result is found for schooling in the US data. This is 
consistent with the earlier results, suggesting that using differences may be appropriate 
for these two variables. In all three regressions Parent Time is positive and significant 
(consistent with the World Bank data). Host Time, however, varies across the three. This 
suggests that, at least for the US results, a difference term may be appropriate as this is 
consistent with the results found there. Finally, the remaining variables, both time-
varying and time-invariant, are relatively unchanged relative to the previous results. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 The goal of this paper has been to employ the panel fixed effects with vector 
decomposition method developed by Plümper and Troeger (forthcoming) to examine the 
extent to which the omission of fixed effects gives misleading coefficients in FDI 
regressions. We find that the resulting biases can be quite significant and that they vary 
across the three most commonly used FDI datasets. As a result, when including fixed 
effects, we find much more consistency in the estimates of time-invariant variables across 
data sets. In general, these new estimates find additional evidence of the importance of 
trade costs. In particular, geographic variables such as whether the parent or host country 
is landlocked or an island nation, which Rose (2004) finds are significant deterrents to 
trade, also seem to deter FDI. This is suggestive of vertical FDI. Nevertheless, other 
variables, especially the distance between capitals, indicates horizontal FDI. That we find 
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mixed results is not surprising, as industry-level results from papers such as Blonigen, 
Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (forthcoming) find that even within US data there are 
significant differences in the motivation behind FDI across industries. Thus, when (as in 
many papers) we aggregate across industries, one might expect evidence of both. What is 
notable, however, is that since XTFEVD yields far more comparable results across our 
datasets, that using country pair fixed effects may be very useful in removing the 
problems this variation causes when industry level data are not available. 
 In addition to our main results, we find that the cultural variables constructed by 
Hofstede (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Hofstede, 2001) are significant 
determinants of FDI. This suggests that further research into the interaction between 
culture and international economic activity is a meaningful one and that further 
understanding of the ways in which these relate can have useful policy implications. 
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Table 1: US Results 
 
 Stock Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS FE XTFEVD OLS FE XTFEVD 
Parent GDP 2.186*** 1.732*** 1.608*** 2.748*** 3.099*** 3.139*** 
 (24.75) (6.48) (9.60) (29.49) (4.82) (13.39) 
Parent Pop -0.699*** -7.148*** -7.090*** -1.027*** -2.084 -2.002*** 
 (7.10) (8.20) (15.42) (9.41) (1.55) (3.01) 
Parent TC -6.588*** -9.624*** -12.225*** -15.798*** -8.206** -8.253*** 
 (4.13) (4.15) (8.45) (5.39) (2.04) (3.92) 
Host GDP 1.446*** 1.737*** 1.675*** 1.972*** 2.118*** 2.125*** 
 (17.69) (9.46) (10.00) (19.50) (5.45) (9.20) 
Host Pop -0.800*** -2.288*** -2.238*** -1.179*** -3.682*** -3.699*** 
 (7.54) (5.30) (4.78) (10.17) (4.64) (5.44) 
Host TC -3.807** -2.030 -2.625* -5.042** -10.014*** -9.950*** 
 (2.26) (1.46) (1.84) (2.36) (3.72) (4.80) 
Host Inv Cost -0.101 -0.547 -0.545* 0.675* 0.101 0.094 
 (0.24) (1.56) (1.70) (1.68) (0.21) (0.19) 
School Diff Neg 0.132 -0.285*** -0.283*** -0.417*** -0.327** -0.339*** 
 (1.24) (3.51) (3.39) (2.78) (2.03) (2.88) 
School Diff Pos 0.851*** 0.448*** 0.444*** 0.869*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 
 (6.16) (5.17) (5.05) (6.78) (5.16) (3.49) 
PD Diff Neg 0.283***  2.149*** 0.220***  0.063*** 
 (5.05)  (2.77e+12) (3.17)  (6.16e+10) 
PD Diff Pos -0.470***  -0.302*** -0.380***  -0.982*** 
 (8.30)  (3.89e+11) (4.67)  (9.65e+11) 
Independ. Diff Neg 0.165**  -1.927*** -0.130  -1.701*** 
 (2.22)  (251.85) (1.57)  (140.23) 
Independ. Diff Pos -0.154**  3.195*** 0.056  0.868*** 
 (2.53)  (109.84) (0.79)  (22.24) 
Masculinity Diff Neg 0.274***  2.723*** 0.316***  0.927*** 
 (4.86)  (93.44) (4.78)  (23.53) 
Masculinity Diff Pos -0.364***  -2.023*** -0.334***  -1.234*** 
 (6.45)  (66.36) (5.28)  (29.50) 
Uncertainty Diff Neg 0.483***  -1.364*** 0.362***  0.007 
 (7.27)  (44.20) (4.66)  (0.16) 
Uncertainty Diff Pos -0.501***  0.810*** -0.453***  0.108*** 
 (7.44)  (37.92) (5.55)  (3.78) 
Time Diff Neg -0.378***  -1.665*** -0.338***  -0.862*** 
 (11.25)  (78.60) (6.86)  (30.55) 
Time Diff Pos 0.336***  2.021*** 0.481***  0.892*** 
 (9.29)  (77.62) (8.61)  (25.41) 
Parent Area -0.340***  2.917*** -0.156**  -0.019 
 (7.81)  (111.45) (2.47)  (0.55) 
Host Area -0.008  0.576*** -0.042  1.181*** 
 (0.19)  (31.79) (0.98)  (49.74) 
Distance 5.186***  -6.226*** -0.676  -11.671***
 (3.29)  (353.70) (0.43)  (508.02) 
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Distance Sq. -0.368***  0.481*** 0.060  0.851*** 
 (3.49)  (28.04) (0.58)  (37.40) 
Colony -0.261  10.704*** -0.346  3.826*** 
 (1.44)  (589.17) (1.54)  (161.91) 
Common Lang 0.400***  -0.939 0.755***  0.519 
 (2.67)  (1.25) (3.68)  (0.53) 
Island 0.476***  -0.918*** -0.221  -1.665*** 
 (2.67)  (18.65) (1.18)  (25.78) 
Landlock -0.132  -2.103*** -0.041  -0.769*** 
 (1.14)  (21.54) (0.37)  (5.94) 
Inbound 1.161***  0.000 1.780***  -0.000 
 (5.78)  (0.00) (6.15)  (0.00) 
X-rate 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (3.44) (1.37) (0.00) (4.30) (1.10) (0.00) 
Year -0.015** 0.057*** 0.056 -0.078*** -0.063** -0.065 
 (2.29) (4.78) (1.10) (6.57) (2.58) (0.97) 
Residuals   1.000***   1.000*** 
   (278.82)   (88.71) 
Constant -55.341*** -94.569*** -125.19*** 71.655*** 59.059* 81.068*** 
 (4.30) (7.08) (40.08) (3.25) (1.77) (20.02) 
Observations 1038 1038 1038 816 816 816 
R-squared 0.88 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.96 0.96 
 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2: OECD Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE XTFEVD 
Parent GDP 2.432*** 2.207*** 2.242*** 
 (57.68) (9.43) (12.85) 
Parent Pop -1.083*** -3.441*** -3.567*** 
 (24.70) (4.46) (5.37) 
Parent TC -6.862*** 8.664*** 8.909*** 
 (5.34) (5.19) (5.49) 
Host GDP 0.709*** 1.628*** 1.674*** 
 (14.99) (7.20) (8.75) 
Host Pop 0.010 -3.387*** -3.575*** 
 (0.22) (4.54) (5.44) 
Host TC -14.489*** 2.429 2.182 
 (11.48) (1.36) (1.36) 
Host Inv Cost -1.688*** -1.127*** -1.109*** 
 (7.63) (3.50) (3.71) 
School Diff Neg -0.122*** 0.012 0.008 
 (3.22) (0.31) (0.24) 
School Diff Pos -0.013 -0.023 -0.027 
 (0.39) (0.74) (0.82) 
PD Diff Neg 0.134***  -0.499*** 
 (4.06)  (3377.09) 
PD Diff Pos -0.322***  -0.024*** 
 (10.39)  (3.18) 
Independence Diff Neg 0.073**  -0.436*** 
 (2.55)  (32.83) 
Independence Diff Pos -0.148***  0.593*** 
 (5.25)  (45.31) 
Masculinity Diff Neg 0.028  0.880*** 
 (1.11)  (68.47) 
Masculinity Diff Pos -0.201***  -1.066*** 
 (7.81)  (82.59) 
Uncertainty Diff Neg -0.098***  -0.266*** 
 (3.14)  (22.25) 
Uncertainty Diff Pos -0.007  0.495*** 
 (0.22)  (41.41) 
Time Diff Neg 0.189***  -1.177*** 
 (7.35)  (83.28) 
Time Diff Pos 0.000  1.344*** 
 (0.02)  (95.62) 
Parent Area -0.039*  1.114*** 
 (1.81)  (99.48) 
Host Area 0.331***  1.437*** 
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 (15.31)  (130.93) 
Distance -2.573***  -5.229*** 
 (6.32)  (622.82) 
Distance Sq. 0.115***  0.258*** 
 (4.09)  (30.89) 
Colony 0.640***  3.870*** 
 (5.84)  (21.92) 
Common Lang 1.273***  -0.750*** 
 (16.15)  (62.44) 
Island -0.250**  -1.307*** 
 (2.55)  (21.21) 
Landlock -0.334***  -1.420*** 
 (5.45)  (33.09) 
X-Rate -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (3.27) (2.76) (0.01) 
Year 0.005 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.88) (7.19) (2.94) 
Inward 0.286*** 0.023 -0.068** 
 (4.37) (0.36) (2.46) 
Residuals   1.000*** 
   (356.63) 
Constant -68.404*** -179.527*** -189.733***
 (6.24) (14.57) (299.97) 
Observations 5450 5450 5450 
R-squared 0.71 0.94 0.94 
 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3: World Bank Results 
 
 Inbound Outbound 
 OLS FE XTFEVD OLS FE XTFEVD 
GDP 0.977*** 1.371*** 1.357*** 2.254*** 2.448*** 2.467*** 
 (11.30) (4.17) (4.19) (17.52) (5.82) (7.25) 
Pop -0.193* -3.698*** -3.703*** -0.933*** -5.419*** -5.412*** 
 (1.92) (4.46) (4.99) (6.75) (6.07) (5.73) 
TC -22.765*** -11.015*** -11.621*** -20.49*** -2.508 -1.909 
 (10.03) (3.47) (3.84) (8.25) (0.68) (0.59) 
School -0.768*** -0.478 -0.495 -0.215 1.614*** 1.613** 
 (3.73) (0.79) (0.76) (0.88) (2.62) (2.49) 
PD 0.240*  3.723*** 0.405***  4.449*** 
 (1.91)  (129.97) (3.00)  (174.57) 
Independence 0.819***  -0.733*** 0.251  -1.870*** 
 (4.66)  (77.65) (1.23)  (199.42) 
Masculinity 0.042  3.334*** -0.174*  4.304*** 
 (0.37)  (33.77) (1.78)  (46.23) 
Uncertainty -0.109  -3.875*** -0.759***  -5.012*** 
 (0.57)  (41.70) (3.68)  (54.65) 
Time -0.058  1.155*** 0.341**  2.189*** 
 (0.40)  (15.93) (2.31)  (35.18) 
Area 0.431***  1.161*** 0.143***  0.952*** 
 (9.87)  (10.01) (3.48)  (8.83) 
Island 0.002  -3.777*** 0.408***  -4.234*** 
 (0.01)  (39.13) (2.94)  (44.73) 
Landlock -0.046  -3.092*** 0.059  -4.633*** 
 (0.19)  (132.06) (0.27)  (220.83) 
X-Rate -0.019 -0.097*** -0.097 0.026 -0.016 -0.017 
 (1.04) (4.36) (0.86) (1.17) (0.80) (0.17) 
Year 0.065*** 0.096*** 0.096 0.049*** 0.077*** 0.078 
 (10.45) (8.58) (0.61) (8.20) (7.61) (0.54) 
Residuals   1.000***   1.000*** 
   (69.53)   (102.16) 
Constant -133.771*** -163.314*** -188.068*** -122.46*** -144.58*** -169.279*** 
 (11.05) (9.71) (205.70) (10.84) (10.32) (189.38) 
Observations 769 769 769 665 665 665 
R-squared 0.64 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.89 
 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Bilateral Data without Differences (XTFEVD Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 US Stock US Sales OECD 
Parent GDP 1.473*** 2.639*** 2.197*** 
 (8.16) (10.60) (12.10) 
Parent Pop -6.443*** -2.981*** -3.545*** 
 (12.28) (3.89) (5.30) 
Parent TC -11.383*** -13.519*** 8.693*** 
 (7.53) (6.10) (5.35) 
Host GDP 1.822*** 2.309*** 1.667*** 
 (9.92) (9.19) (8.67) 
Host Pop -2.026*** -3.188*** -3.617*** 
 (3.66) (4.08) (5.50) 
Host TC -2.539* -6.911*** 2.056 
 (1.69) (3.23) (1.28) 
Host Inv Cost -1.081*** -0.587 -1.091*** 
 (3.22) (1.23) (3.62) 
Parent School 0.231*** 0.626*** 0.073 
 (5.20) (10.13) (1.34) 
Host School -0.269*** -0.195*** 0.065 
 (6.24) (3.15) (1.25) 
Parent PD 8.799*** 3.745*** 2.195*** 
 (1.12e+13) (3.71e+12) (14854.13) 
Host PD 3.089*** 3.526*** 4.345*** 
 (3.93e+12) (3.49e+12) (481.63) 
Parent Independence 0.713*** -0.837*** 0.991*** 
 (86.38) (66.25) (31.89) 
Host Independence -0.940*** -0.059 -1.377*** 
 (16.02) (0.78) (42.74) 
Parent Masculinity 4.541*** 1.610*** 1.763*** 
 (74.88) (20.44) (46.37) 
Host Masculinity 1.585*** 1.874*** 2.856*** 
 (21.96) (20.94) (73.31) 
Parent Uncertainty -5.524*** -2.807*** -0.907*** 
 (82.67) (32.18) (52.56) 
Host Uncertainty -3.322*** -2.348*** -2.943*** 
 (83.03) (45.01) (167.23) 
Parent Time 2.453*** 1.256*** 3.324*** 
 (62.67) (24.82) (86.34) 
Host Time -0.506*** -0.136 1.640*** 
 (6.47) (1.35) (39.15) 
Parent Area 2.664*** 0.440*** 0.949*** 
 (34.97) (4.45) (26.20) 
Host Area -0.084 0.889*** 1.128*** 
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 (1.34) (10.59) (33.63) 
Distance -10.315*** -9.554*** -9.851*** 
 (169.40) (121.75) (1117.40) 
Distance Sq. 0.713*** 0.710*** 0.581*** 
 (44.21) (34.27) (64.75) 
Colony 5.758*** 1.537*** 3.906*** 
 (330.11) (70.44) (23.23) 
Common Lang -3.635*** -0.376 -1.524*** 
 (4.28) (0.36) (132.90) 
Island -2.389*** -2.590*** -3.472*** 
 (42.35) (37.57) (55.13) 
Landlock -1.147*** -0.539*** -1.651*** 
 (12.54) (4.58) (39.95) 
Inbound 0.000 0.000 0.699*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (23.59) 
X-rate -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Year 0.051 -0.081 0.064** 
 (0.78) (0.96) (2.15) 
Residuals 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (248.96) (87.24) (269.21) 
Constant -128.228*** 91.091*** -187.852***
 (37.21) (21.59) (236.82) 
Observations 997 792 5450 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.94 
 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Description Source 
Real FDI stock ln(parent’s FDI stock in millions of constant 2000 USD) BEA 
Real FDI sales ln(Total sales of foreign affiliates in millions of constant USD) BEA 
Parent GDP ln(parent county real GDP in millions of constant 2000 USD) WDI 
Parent Pop ln(parent country population in thousands) WDI 
Parent TC ln(GDP of parent/(Exports+Imports of parent)) WDI 
Host GDP ln(host county real GDP in millions of constant 2000 USD) WDI 
Host Pop ln(host country population in thousands) WDI 
Host TC ln(GDP of host/(Exports+Imports of host)) WDI 
Host Inv Cost ln(1/host’s BERI measure of business environment risk) BERI 
Colony =1 if used to be in same colony group together  Rose (2004) 
Common Lang =1 if common language  Rose (2004) 
Island # of island nations in pair Rose (2004) 
Landlock # of landlocked nations in pair  Rose (2004) 
Distance Ln of miles between capital cities http://www.indo.com 
Distance Sq. (Distance)2 Our construction 
Parent Area Ln of square kilometers of area of Parent WDI 
Host Area Ln of square kilometers of area of Host WDI 
Inbound  =1 if inbound Our construction 
X-rate % change in the exchange rate between parent and host (or country and 
US in WB data) from t-1 to t. 
WDI 
Parent School Parent country average years of schooling for those over age 25 Barro & Lee (2000) 
Host School Host country average years of schooling for those over age 25 Barro & Lee (2000) 
School Diff Neg - Ln of (Parent School - Host School) where parent has less schooling Our construction 
School Diff Pos Ln of (Parent School - Host School)  where parent has more schooling Our construction 
Cultural differences Scores from 1 to 100  
Parent PD Parent country score on power distance 
High values indicate acceptance of a less equal society 
Hofstede (2001) 
Host PD Host country score on power distance Hofstede (2001) 
PD Diff Neg  Ln of abs value of (Parent PD - Host PD) where parent has lower PD Our construction 
PD Diff Pos Ln of abs value of (Parent PD - Host PD) where parent has higher PD Our construction 
Parent Individualism Parent country score on individualism 
High values for more individualistic societies 
Hofstede (2001) 
Host Individualism Host country score on individualism Hofstede (2001) 
Individualism Diff 
Neg  
Ln of abs value of (Parent Individualism - Host Individualism) where 
parent has lower Individualism 
Our construction 
Individualism Diff 
Pos 
Ln of abs value of (Parent Individualism - Host Individualism) where 
parent has higher Individualism 
Our construction 
Parent Masculinity Parent country score on masculinity 
High values for countries with “masculine” values. 
Hofstede (2001) 
Host Masculinity Host country score on masculinity Hofstede (2001) 
Masculinity Diff Neg  Ln of abs value of (Parent Masculinity - Host Masculinity) where 
parent has lower scores 
Our construction 
Masculinity Diff Pos Ln of abs value of (Parent Masculinity - Host Masculinity) where 
parent has higher scores 
Our construction 
Parent Uncertainty Parent country score on uncertainty tolerance 
High values for countries where individuals value predictability and 
Hofstede (2001) 
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avoid uncertain situations 
Host Uncertainty Host country score on uncertainty tolerance  Hofstede (2001) 
Uncertainty Diff Neg  Ln of abs value of (Parent Uncertainty - Host Uncertainty) where 
parent has lower scores 
Our construction 
Uncertainty Diff Pos Ln of abs value of (Parent Uncertainty - Host Uncertainty) where 
parent has higher scores 
Our construction 
Parent Time Parent country score on long-term orientation 
High values in countries where people are oriented toward future and 
value thrift and perseverance 
Hofstede (2001) 
Host Time Host country score on long-term orientation Hofstede (2001) 
Time Diff Neg  Ln of abs value of (Parent Time - Host Time) where parent has lower 
scores 
Our construction 
Time Diff Pos Ln of abs value of (Parent Time - Host Time) where parent has higher 
scores 
Our construction 
 
BEA= Bureau of Economic Analysis; www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/di1fdibal.htm 
WDI = World Development Indicators; http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/ 
BERI = Business Environment Risk Intelligence; www.beri.com 
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 Tables A2: Summary Statistics  
 
A2.1 US data 
FDI stock (1038 observations) FDI sales (816 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI stock/sales 8.05 2.38 1.31 12.53 9.33 2.51 0.02 13.17 
Parent GDP 27.92 1.90 24.02 29.91 27.97 1.88 23.71 29.91 
Parent Pop 11.31 1.57 8.04 14.05 11.34 1.56 8.09 14.04 
Parent TC 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.40 0.29 0.05 0.20 0.40 
Host GDP 27.89 1.86 24.02 29.91 27.92 1.86 24.23 29.91 
Host Pop 11.34 1.52 8.13 14.05 11.34 1.53 8.16 14.05 
Host TC 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.40 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.40 
Host Inv Cost -4.15 0.19 -4.42 -3.51 -4.14 0.18 -4.42 -3.56 
School Diff Neg 0.56 0.75 -1.27 2.32 0.55 0.74 -1.27 2.29 
School Diff Pos 0.64 0.77 -1.02 2.32 0.63 0.76 -1.02 2.30 
PD Diff Neg -1.34 1.43 -3.99 0.00 -1.32 1.44 -3.99 0.00 
PD Diff Pos 1.15 1.39 0.00 3.99 1.18 1.40 0.00 4.16 
Independence 
Diff Neg -1.49 1.67 -4.34 0.00 -1.49 1.68 -4.34 0.00 
Independence 
Diff Pos 1.59 1.73 0.00 4.34 1.61 1.73 0.00 4.34 
Masculinity Diff 
Neg -1.18 1.43 -4.04 0.00 -1.18 1.43 -4.04 0.00 
Masculinity Diff 
Pos 1.27 1.46 0.00 4.04 1.26 1.46 0.00 4.04 
Uncertainity Diff 
Neg -1.41 1.55 -4.06 0.00 -1.41 1.55 -4.06 0.00 
Uncertainity Diff 
Pos 1.30 1.50 0.00 4.06 1.33 1.52 0.00 4.06 
Time Diff Neg -1.15 1.39 -4.49 0.00 -1.15 1.40 -4.49 0.00 
Time Diff Pos 1.10 1.35 0.00 4.49 1.10 1.37 0.00 4.49 
Parent Area 14.40 2.03 10.40 16.05 14.39 2.04 10.40 16.05 
Host Area 14.36 2.06 10.40 16.05 14.36 2.06 10.40 16.05 
Distance 8.40 0.56 6.12 9.20 8.39 0.56 6.12 9.20 
Distance Sq. 70.79 8.68 37.46 84.66 70.78 8.68 37.46 84.66 
Colony 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Common Lang 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Island 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Landlock 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Inbound 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1 
X-rate 1.00E+08 1.92E+09 -0.99952 5.21E+10 8550915 1.75E+08 -0.99952 4.80E+09 
Year 1990 6.06 1980 2000 1991 4.83 1983 2000 
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A2.2 OECD data (5450 Observations) 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI stock 5.80 3.00 -2.30 11.96 
Parent GDP 26.75 1.37 23.49 29.87 
Parent Pop 10.18 1.41 8.08 14.05 
Parent TC 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.40 
Host GDP 26.73 1.33 24.28 29.87 
Host Pop 10.25 1.42 8.16 14.05 
Host TC 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.40 
Host Inv Cost -4.11 0.17 -4.42 -3.60 
School Diff Neg 0.13 0.76 -6.21 2.16 
School Diff Pos 0.19 0.82 -6.21 2.16 
PD Diff Neg -1.31 1.46 -4.23 0.00 
PD Diff Pos 1.21 1.46 0.00 4.53 
Independence Diff Neg -1.33 1.50 -4.29 0.00 
Independence Diff Pos 1.26 1.49 0.00 4.29 
Masculinity Diff Neg -1.51 1.65 -4.50 0.00 
Masculinity Diff Pos 1.43 1.64 0.00 4.62 
Uncertainity Diff Pos -1.49 1.61 -4.39 0.00 
Uncertainity Diff Pos 1.41 1.58 0.00 4.39 
Time Diff Neg -1.13 1.42 -4.65 0.00 
Time Diff Pos 1.23 1.46 0.00 4.65 
Parent Area 12.73 1.71 10.40 16.05 
Host Area 12.81 1.75 10.40 16.05 
Distance 7.50 1.13 4.76 9.42 
Distance Sq. 57.47 16.71 22.70 88.64 
Colony 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Common Lang 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Island 0.20 0.42 0 2 
Landlock 0.29 0.50 0 2 
X-rate 3.29 85.65 -1.00 3985.28 
Year 1994 4.58 1983 2000 
Inward 0.72 0.45 0 1 
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A2.3 World Bank data 
Inbound (769 observations) Outbound (665 observations) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI 
inflow/outflow 21.27 2.03 12.45 26.50 21.30 2.34 11.02 26.23
GDP host/parent 26.15 1.37 23.49 29.91 26.39 1.31 23.49 29.91
POP host/parent 10.28 1.50 7.97 14.05 10.17 1.43 7.97 14.05
TC host/parent 0.26 0.05 0.19 0.48 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.42 
School 
host/parent 1.97 0.43 0.25 2.51 2.06 0.33 0.86 2.51 
PD host/parent 3.78 0.49 2.40 4.64 3.72 0.48 2.40 4.64 
Independence 
host/parent  4.00 0.49 2.89 4.51 4.06 0.46 2.89 4.51 
Masculinity 
host/parent  3.78 0.69 1.61 4.70 3.72 0.74 1.61 4.70 
Uncertainty 
host/parent 4.03 0.38 3.14 4.64 4.05 0.39 3.14 4.64 
Time host/parent 3.64 0.41 2.56 4.77 3.63 0.41 2.56 4.77 
Area host/parent 12.88 1.79 10.40 16.05 12.87 1.81 10.40 16.05
Island host/parent 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Landlockock 
host/parent 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 
X-rate 
host/parent 0.17 1.42 -1.00 23.10 0.17 1.51 -1.00 23.10
Year 1987 8.45 1970 2000 1987.423 8.363 1970 2000 
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Table A3: Countries in Sample 
US data OECD data World Bank Data 
Australia Australia Australia 
Austria Austria Austria 
  Bangladesh 
Belgium Belgium Belgium 
Brazil  Brazil 
Canada Canada Canada 
China China China 
Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic 
Denmark Denmark Denmark 
Finland Finland Finland 
France France France 
Germany Germany Germany 
Hungary Hungary Hungary 
India India India 
Ireland Ireland Ireland 
Italy Italy Italy 
Japan Japan Japan 
Korea (South) Korea (South) Korea (South) 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
New Zealand New Zealandb New Zealand 
Norway Norway Norway 
Pakistan   
Philippines  Philippines 
Poland Poland Poland 
Portugal Portugal Portugal 
Slovak Republica Slovak Republicb Slovak Republic 
Spain Spain Spain 
Sweden Sweden Sweden 
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland 
  Thailand 
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom 
United States United States United States 
a only in sales data b parent country only  
 
